The Graham Act Still Needs Trump to Use It

The House voted 262–159 on September 16 to pass the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, then left town until after Election Day. The Senate had already cleared it 86–11 in August. President Trump has said he will sign. That is the wire, and it is true as far as it goes.

The residual is what “global” means in the statute. This is not a United Nations measure and not an automatic embargo on the world. It is a U.S. tariff machine aimed at the countries that still lift Russian barrels — and it still runs through the White House.

The buyer, not the barrel, is the target

Section 112 tells the president, within 30 days of enactment, to raise duties on remaining U.S. imports from Russia to as much as 500 percent. Most Russian energy is already banned here under the 2022 Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act. The primary tariff is theater on a locked door.

Section 113 is the working gear. Within the same 30 days, the president “shall” raise the duty on all goods imported from certain countries to as much as 100 percent. A country qualifies if it was among the five largest importers of Russian crude or gas in the year before enactment and it knowingly makes new purchases 30 days or more after the law is signed — or if it ranked among the top five facilitators of oil-sanctions evasion, including shadow-fleet work, in that same lookback year. CRS notes the clocks almost collide: the duty is due on day 30, and the purchase trigger starts on day 30. Implementation will be a lawyer’s fight, not a light switch.

India and China sit in the volume formula by construction. The 100 percent levy would not be a tax on Urals. It would be a tax on their electronics, chemicals, and apparel at the U.S. dock. That is why House Democrats who want Ukraine aid still voted no: they read a Ukraine bill as another delegation of tariff power. Fifty-eight Democrats voted yes anyway. Seven Republicans voted no. 262 of 421 is not two-thirds. The Senate margin would survive a veto. The House margin would not.

Signature is not the same as use

Graham died in July, days after a White House deal and a trip to Kyiv, at 71. Colleagues renamed the file and moved it as memorial and as leverage. Zelenskyy sat in the Senate gallery for the earlier vote. Trump extracted an Iran add-on: an extension of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, the piece that does not sunset with the rest of the Act after five years. That tracks the same secondary-buyer logic Treasury has been shopping at the G20.

Section 115 lets the president waive duties, sanctions, or restrictions by certifying that the waiver is in the national interest and sending Congress an unclassified report, with a classified annex allowed. That is a letter, not a new statute. A president who wants a channel to Putin, or who does not want a 100 percent fight with Beijing and New Delhi while oil logistics are already rerouting, can sign the Act and then park the secondary tariffs.

USTR, not the president, later adjusts rates and re-runs the top-five importer list every 180 days. Agency action is reviewable under the APA. The initial “shall impose” is presidential, which courts treat more deferentially. The bill was written to look mandatory. It was also written so the same man who signs it can empty it.

The global act is a 100 percent tariff on other countries’ exports to the United States — if they keep buying Russian energy and if the White House does not certify otherwise.

What still mis-prices is treating the enrolled bill as a closed Ukraine file. If Trump signs and then names China and India, the shock is a trade war layered on an energy war. If he signs and waives, Moscow reads a memorial. The test is the 30-day window after the pen: a Federal Register notice listing countries, or a national-interest letter that lists none.