← Today's edition

Governance STATE News

Europe Is Turning Competition Law Into a Labor-and-Wholesale Weapon

Poland’s cartel decisions, Britain’s AI-search rules and the Booking judgment all make access—not simply price—the object of enforcement.

Freight trucks and high-visibility workers outside a rain-wet distribution centre at dawn

European competition authorities are widening the places where market power can be found. Poland has fined a labor-market arrangement and pharmaceutical wholesalers; Britain wants AI assistants on search-choice screens; an EU court has backed a ban on Booking’s Etraveli acquisition. The common concern is access to a market, a job or a customer.

Europe Is Turning Competition Law Into a Labor-and-Wholesale Weapon

Competition law once made its public case most easily at the checkout: a cartel lifted prices; a merger reduced the number of sellers. This month’s European files point somewhere more expansive. The contested asset is increasingly the route by which a worker changes jobs, a pharmacy obtains stock, or a reader reaches information.

Freight trucks and high-visibility workers outside a rain-wet distribution centre at dawn

Europe has not announced a unified new theory of competition. It does not need to have done so for the pattern to matter.

Within a fortnight, Poland’s competition authority fined a labor-market arrangement involving the Biedronka supermarket chain’s owner and transport contractors; imposed more than PLN 900 million in penalties on pharmaceutical wholesalers; Britain’s Competition and Markets Authority proposed putting qualifying AI assistants on Google’s search-choice screens; and the EU General Court upheld the ban on Booking’s purchase of Etraveli. The cases are legally distinct. Their shared intuition is that power can be exercised before a price is ever printed.

That changes the practical question for companies. It is no longer only whether they set the terms of sale. It is whether they control a route other firms, workers or customers need in order to bargain.

Poland treated a driver’s ability to leave as a competition issue

The Biedronka case is the clearest break with the old retail picture. Poland’s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, UOKiK, fined Jeronimo Martins Polska, 29 transport companies and eight individuals more than PLN 570 million for an arrangement that it says limited drivers’ movement between carriers serving Biedronka distribution centres.

According to the authority, the carriers agreed not to compete for workers and the retailer’s Polish owner coordinated the arrangement. A driver who moved to a rival contractor could face a waiting period before working at the distribution centre. That made hiring someone from a competitor commercially unattractive—and made changing employer materially harder for the driver.

The injury is not hard to understand in labor-market terms: fewer credible outside options weaken an employee’s leverage over pay and conditions. But UOKiK’s intervention matters because it puts that labor-market mechanism squarely inside competition enforcement. The market at issue is not just haulage capacity. It is the ability to sell labor to another buyer.

Medicine wholesalers show how collusion survives upstream of the pharmacy

The pharmaceutical decision reaches the other end of the supply chain. UOKiK said it imposed more than PLN 900 million in fines on pharmaceutical wholesalers whose combined share of drug wholesale sales exceeded 70% between 2015 and 2022. The authority’s case is that the firms coordinated the terms on which pharmacies could obtain medicines.

Consumers do not negotiate with wholesalers; they encounter the consequences downstream, in what a pharmacy can source and what it must pay. That distance is precisely the point. Competition policy has always been capable of reaching upstream cartels. The new emphasis is more revealing when placed beside the driver case: the authority is following the constraint to the point where it is imposed, whether that point is a distribution centre’s hiring rule or a pharmaceutical software-and-wholesale network.

Neither case establishes that every commercial dependency is an antitrust violation. It does establish a harder operating environment for firms that treat a contractual gate, a staffing convention or an industry system as peripheral to market competition.

The CMA’s Google proposals take the same concern into a digital setting. The authority wants Android and Chrome users to receive a search-service choice screen when they first use a device or browser, followed by an annual default-provider prompt. Its updated consultation would allow AI assistants on those screens if they meet technical and security criteria.

That is not a declaration that an AI assistant is simply another search engine. The CMA explicitly frames the proposal as a response to changing search behavior and still needs to make a final conduct decision. Yet the regulatory move is significant: the screen on which a default is chosen has become a scarce distribution point, and an assistant may now compete for it.

The proposal also requires clear attribution of publisher content. That detail prevents the debate from collapsing into a contest between Google and the latest chatbot. A choice architecture reallocates traffic; the CMA is trying to decide how that traffic should preserve a legible route back to the people who made the information.

Booking confirms that a customer channel can be the competitive asset

The General Court’s 9 September judgment in Booking Holdings v Commission supplies the merger-control version of this logic. It dismissed Booking’s challenge to the European Commission’s prohibition of its acquisition of Etraveli, Europe’s leading online flight-booking operator. The Court accepted that the deal would strengthen Booking’s dominant hotel-OTA position by raising barriers to entry and expansion.

The important asset was not a conventional overlap between two hotel sellers. It was a channel: flights could bring customers into a travel ecosystem that Booking’s hotel rivals would have more difficulty replicating. As Culled’s earlier examination of the ruling put it, the legal issue was adjacency as a route to customers, not a simple addition of market share.

Europe’s emerging competition map is drawn around access: to labor, inventory, an audience and a customer funnel.

The Polish decisions, the British consultation and the Booking judgment should not be mistaken for a coordinated European campaign. They involve different authorities, laws and remedies. A fine for collusion is not a conduct requirement; a merger prohibition is not a choice screen.

But they do point to the same boardroom blind spot. The next competition risk may sit outside the price list: in the worker a contractor agrees not to hire, the wholesaler a pharmacy cannot bypass, the default a reader never changes, or the adjacent service that quietly becomes the last route to a customer. That is where European authorities are increasingly looking for power.

Continue reading

Sources

UOKiK decisions and releases on labor-market collusion and pharmaceutical wholesale; UK Competition and Markets Authority search-choice consultation; General Court press release in Booking Holdings v Commission, T-1139/23.

More in Governance

View hub →